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CHAPTER 9
Sellars and Lewis on the Given
and Empirical Knowledge
Tomasz Zarębski
Clarence I. Lewis has often been taken to be a proponent of epistemological
foundationalism due to the conception of givenness that he developed in his
account of knowledge. According to his theory, every empirical, or non-
analytic statement refers to “the given element in experience” (Lewis 1929,
p. 36), the latter constituting the ultimate foundation for our empirical
knowledge. However, Lewis’s thorough elaboration of his understanding
of the given could also be read as a strong criticism of traditional founda-
tionalism, and could even justify ascribing anti-foundationalist to him
(Gowans 1984). As a result, the notion of givenness in Lewis’s “concep-
tual pragmatism” is ambiguous and calls for clariﬁcation and reconsidera-
tion. One perspective that sheds light on the issue is that advanced by
Wilfrid Sellars in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, where he
coined the concept of “the Myth of the Given” (Sellars 1997, p. 33, ﬁrst
published in 1956) – the idea widely commented and recently reinter-
preted, among others, by Robert B. Brandom (Brandom 1997, 2002) and
John McDowell (McDowell 1996). I shall ﬁrst reconstruct a Sellarsian
understanding of the given and explore why it is a myth; at the same
time I will also distinguish between the following three aspects of empiri-
cal knowledge the propositional aspect of perception, the normative
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aspect of knowledge (including fallibilism), and the indispensable learning
aspect in acquiring new knowledge (including inferentialism). Next, with
this background in place, I will explore Lewis’s construal of the given and
try to juxtapose the general characteristics of the epistemic sphere (as
distinguished in Sellars) in Lewis’s account. I will argue that since
Lewis’s conception of givenness is not directly epistemological in the
Sellarsian sense and his account of empirical knowledge has roughly a
Sellarsian structure, then Lewis’s conception of the given is immune to
Sellarsian criticism of the “myth of the given.”
SELLARS ON EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE AND MYTHICAL
CHARACTER OF GIVENNESS
In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind the problem of givenness is
examined predominantly in terms of to the empirical given (Sellars 1997,
p. 14) The empirical given may be characterized in two different ways:
ﬁrst, that we as knowers can take our sensory experiences as basic,
primitive epistemological items, and, second, that these experiences as
such can serve as premises in inferences that form our beliefs. The critical
misunderstanding comes down to the fact that our sensory experiences
can hardly be considered epistemic, since they are not propositions and
accordingly are not truth-evaluable. “They are not like judgements; they
no more have propositional form than does an apple or a thunderbolt”
(DeVries and Triplett 2000, p. xxxi). That being said, they cannot be
straightforwardly included in our arguments as reasons because they have
no epistemic status.
For our sensations to exemplify a form of knowing, they would have
to be the apprehensions of facts, instead of particulars. If sense contents
are some particular sense-data (visual images, patches of red color,
etc.), then “the sensing of sense contents cannot constitute knowledge,
inferential or non-inferential” (Sellars 1997, p. 16). In contrast with
these sense contents are facts, for example, when our perception is
understood not as “seeing a red sense content,” but rather as “seeing
that a certain physical object is red” (ibid.). Consequently, every item
of knowledge, even the most primitive and non-inferential if it is to
perform an epistemic role of justiﬁcation, must have the possibility of
being stated in the indicative mood as a judgment (Brandom 1997,
pp. 127–128). Apprehended facts can be expressed only in the form of
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a proposition. My perception, then, is sensing facts, “sensing that. . . . ”
And accordingly, the sentence ascribing knowledge to someone,
including myself, has to contain a that clause: “S knows that things
are such and so.”
The ambiguities in sense-datum theories that make them count as a
version of the Myth of the Given stem from the conﬂation of sensing
something and sensing that something is the case. Insofar as establishing
the foundational warrant of perceptual knowledge requires showing why
such knowledge needs no further justiﬁcation, then perception is under-
stood as mere sensing: non-conceptual, unanalyzable, and non-proposi-
tional. Yet, when the issue of perception as epistemic foundation able to
confer further justiﬁcations on our observational knowledge is at stake,
then perception is understood as non-inferential propositions. (DeVries
and Triplett 2000, p. 12). Such a tendency was evidently epitomized in
Russell’s distinction between non-propositional “knowledge by acquain-
tance” and propositional “knowledge by description,” where, in Sellars’s
view, the mere concept of “knowledge by acquaintance” is fairly mis-
leading, since, in fact, as non-propositional, it does not count as knowl-
edge (Sellars 1997, p. 18).
Apart from the claim that a knowing has propositional form, Sellars
insists on its not being reducible to anything outside the epistemological
sphere. Thus, epistemic facts cannot be “analyzed without remain-
der . . . into non-epistemic facts, whether phenomenal or behavioral, public
or private” (Sellars 1997, p. 19). He compares such attempts of convert-
ing the sphere of sui generis epistemic items into the domain of a sort of
descriptive – naturalistic, psychological, etc. – items to the notorious
examples of naturalistic fallacy in ethics, as described by G. E. Moore in
Principia Ethica (Moore 1922). Moore claimed that analyzing the good
in terms of pleasure mistakenly relies on reducing an essentially normative
concept to naturalistic phenomena of, for example, someone’s feeling
pleasant stimuli. For Sellars, epistemology is as essentially and irreducibly
normative as ethics. And although Sellars himself does not employ the
term “evaluative” or, better “normative,” in Empiricism and the
Philosophy of Mind, it is also quite legitimate to apply these adjectives
to epistemology (see DeVries and Triplett 2000, p. 13; Brandom 1997,
p. 127; McDowell 1996, p. 14; Sachs 2015, p. 76). In what sense is
epistemology normative? In short: in the sense that epistemic claims
need our endorsing. They are, in principle, open to our assessments as
to their correctness, plausibility, rightness, and as such they are require
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justiﬁcation. Therefore, the myth of the given consists in reducing a
speciﬁcally epistemic sphere, which is normative, to some other, non-
epistemic, descriptive sphere, and treating the latter as a foundation for
the former.
Another aspect of the myth of the given – the one that I take to be
implied in Sellars considerations on “inconsistent triad” of empiricism
(Sellars 1997, pp. 20–21) – relies on our confusing what is learned with
what is unlearned in perception. Empiricists, Sellars objects, “have taken
givenness to be a fact that presupposes no learning, no forming of associa-
tions, no setting up of stimulus-response connections. In short, they have
tended to equate sensing sense contents with being conscious” (Sellars 1997,
p. 20). From the other direction, they usually acknowledge that “all
knowledge that something is thus-and-so . . . all subsumption of particulars
under universals, involves learning, concept formation” (ibid.). Still, for
unlearned sense contents to be a candidate for basic, non-inferential
knowing, it must involve someone’s classiﬁcatory ability to assert, in a
proposition, that a sensed particular falls within such and such category or
concept. Because the latter engages some minimal but necessary concep-
tual competence, it turns out, as empiricists themselves assume, to be
something learned. The problem with empiricism is that it maintains
that both claims at the same time.1 Empiricism conﬂates these claims
because it illusorily looks for an ultimate and solid foundation for knowl-
edge. And when speaking about the speciﬁc character of the epistemic
sphere in addition to recognizing the propositional and normative status
of epistemic claims, our mere ability to state such claims is a matter of our
learning from others. I will call this the learning aspect of knowledge.
All the aforementioned features of the epistemic sphere are, in a different
way, present in Sellars’s reﬂections in section VIII: “Does empirical knowl-
edge have a foundation?” (Sellars 1997, pp. 68–79), which can be regarded
as the climax of the whole essay. Here, he deﬁnes the myth of the given in a
slightly new manner: as
1 At least if the proponents of empiricism still want to stick to an old, deeply rooted
empirical tradition of nominalism (Sellars 1997, p. 21); otherwise, they would
have to save their position by accepting some sort of realistic assumptions about
pre-existence of universals and about our immediate, innate knowledge of them
(Brandom 1997, p. 130).
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“the idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of
fact that (a) each fact can not only be noninferentially known to be the
case but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter of
fact, or of general truths; and (b) the noninferential knowledge of facts
belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for
all factual claims – particular and general – about the world” (Sellars
1997, pp. 68–69).
This formulation of the myth differs from the former accounts, because
Sellars restricts himself only to the possibility of propositionally struc-
tured epistemic items to serve as epistemic givens. Accordingly, if a
proposition is to count as given, it must be non-inferential, which
means that it cannot be inferred from any other propositions. Only if
this condition were satisﬁed would a candidate for the given be episte-
mically independent (see DeVries and Triplett 2000, pp. 104–105).
Once such a proposition is stated, it becomes “the ultimate court of
appeals” for all further empirical statements about the world. While itself
not having been inferred from any other statement, it is the one from
which other claims are inferred, functioning as an unjustiﬁed justiﬁer.
That being the case, it, at the same time, becomes the propositional
foundation for empirical knowledge.
In such an account, an epistemic given, despite its being proposi-
tional, is deprived both of its normative character – since the non-
inferential claims in question are credible as they stand, not having to
be evaluated, justiﬁed, or endorsed – and of the element, for the part of
subjects, that has to be learned in order to be able to reliably such non-
inferential claims. What particularly speaks for the mythical character of
this view is that facts that are “noninferentially known to be the case”
presuppose “no other knowledge either of particular matter of fact, or of
general truths” (cf. Brandom 1998, p. 216, 1997, p. 162). Thus, one can
read Sellars’s understanding of the authority of observation reports
(Konstatierungen) – as setting out, ﬁrst and foremost, arguments against
the view that no other knowledge is needed to state non-inferential,
epistemically independent claims. These arguments, in turn, lead Sellars
straightforwardly to anti-foundationalism. At the same time, they weigh
in favor of both the normativity of epistemic statements, including
observational reports, and the necessity of our presupposing certain
previous knowledge that must be learned in advance, if we are to make
reliable observation reports.
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So what does Sellars say about observation reports?2 Since they
are supposed to express knowledge, they cannot be supported by
other statements; yet, given that they supposedly express knowledge,
they must possess cognitive, epistemic credibility or authority. But
what is such credibility constituted by? According to Sellars, there are
two conditions for a report, for example “This is green,” to have such
authority: ﬁrst, it must be “a symptom or sign of the presence of a
green object in standard conditions” and, second, “the perceiver
must know that tokens of ‘This is green’ are symptoms of the pre-
sence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual
perception” (Sellars 1997, p. 75). Thus, the perceiver must be able to
infer from the mere occurrence of such a report to the existence of a
green object, and thus must have the concept green as well as the
concept of uttering “This is green,” together with the concept of
standard conditions of perception (Sellars 1997, pp. 74–75). Indeed,
her report has to be “an instance of a general mode of behavior
which, in a given linguistic community, it is reasonable to sanction
or support” (Sellars 1997, p. 74). As a result, Sellars assumes a sort of
reliabilism. Moreover, one can legitimately ascribe to this stance a
certain version of inferentialism: one that requires the perceiver to
have the ability to perform an inference from the token of “This is
green” to the assertion of the existence of a green item in front of her
(cf. Brandom 2002).
Sellars’s account of authoritative observation reports, involves both
the learning and normative aspects of the epistemic sphere. According to
this account, “one couldn’t have observational knowledge of any fact
unless one knew many other things as well” (Sellars 1997, p. 75). These
“other things” comprise the language within our linguistic community,
the patterns of common behavior in certain types of situations that this
community displays, and the differentiation between standard and
unconventional perceptual circumstances. All of these are acquired in
the course of our growing up, training, or learning a language. Although
2Here I only discuss the conclusions of Sellars’s positive account of observational
knowledge, focusing neither on his more detailed criticism of empiricism with
respect to so called Konstatierungen, nor on wider controversies concerning
Sellars’s position. For a thorough discussion of this, see DeVries and Triplett
(2000, pp. 67–107).
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it is still unclear in which moment a child becomes a legitimate knower
and a credible reporter of its observations (e.g., see Alston 1983), it is
clear that such reliability is acquired from how we are corrected, sup-
ported, or sanctioned by other community members. In this way, the
authority of observation reports is based not only on its content and
the physical context of it, but also on “the cultural context of the
reporter, for it is only in light of all these factors that the report can be
correct, and, as correct, can license the inference to its (probable) truth”
(DeVries and Triplett 2000, p. 82).
Unsurprisingly, along with the educational, cultural, or learning aspect
of our report-making, the normative aspect of it appears. Being able to
infer from one’s own making an observational report to one’s asserting the
existence of an item that this report speaks about is a precondition of the
authority of such a report (Sellars 1997, p. 75). The involvement of
inferring, of justifying and being able to justify what one says, of giving
reasons for a statement and endorsing it, means that in making author-
itative observational report “we are placing it in the logical space of
reasons” (Sellars 1997, p. 76). This, in turn, is clearly a manifestation
of the normativity of empirical knowledge. And in just this sense knowl-
edge has no ultimate foundation – in thinking it has, we go beyond the
normative and consequently succumb to the myth of the given. Sellars
concludes that “Empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension,
science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a
self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not
all at once” (Sellars 1997, p. 79). Knowledge is not only normative, but,
at least in principle, fallible.
Now, let us ask the question: why is any given always mythical? If we
assume, following Snowden (Snowden 2009; also Sachs 2015, pp. 23–
35), that the core of the myth of the given is the deﬁnition from section
VIII of Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind – certain facts can be
non-inferentially known without our presupposing any other knowl-
edge, and these facts constitute “the ultimate court of appeal” for any
other empirical claim about the world – then we have to agree that the
given is a speciﬁcally epistemological concept. In the last resort, it comes
down to the idea that there is a sort of propositional, empirical knowl-
edge that can be gained while no other knowledge is presupposed or
involved. Then, “the idea of ‘givenness’ is a conception of the acquisi-
tion of knowledge. For the ‘given’ to be received is for knowledge to be
generated (or present)” (Snowden 2009, p. 102). Sellars opposes such a
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view with a sort of epistemic and conceptual holism: epistemic in the
sense that all cognitive claims are placed in the background of the
battery of some other claims. Because there is no way of stepping
outside this theoretical, justiﬁcatory sphere, “there are no non-theoreti-
cal givens” (Snowden 2009, p. 104); and because knowledge qua given,
if such a thing existed, is (by Sellars’s deﬁnition) epistemological, there
cannot be knowledge qua given.
In this sense, such things as “sense-data,” “sense-contents,” but also
“episodes,” “sensations, feelings, after-images, tickles and itches, etc.”
fall victim to the myth of the given (Sellars 1997, p. 21) Sellars speaks
about things like “lookings or appearings” (Sellars 1997, p. 32), or
“seemings,” and he speaks about the “logic of ‘looks’” (ibid. et passim) –
despite the fact that they all supposedly provide empirical, though non-
conceptual content for our worldly beliefs (see Forman 2006), are still
outside strictly conceived epistemic sphere.3 For that reason, they cannot
be given – on pain of being mythologized. And it seems that something
similar can be said not only about our sensory experience, but also about
many other things that have been candidates for givenness, including
material objects, the physical world, etc.
To summarize: the epistemic sphere is speciﬁed here by three
different, though interrelated, general characteristics, namely by its
propositional character, its normative character, and by what I
have called the learning aspect. As a direct consequence of the
normativity of knowledge, one can also point to its fallibilism, and as
a consequence of Sellarsian learning aspect, its inferentialism. The
given is determined as a speciﬁcally epistemological concept that must
be ‘mythical’ because it involves either introducing non-epistemic
items into the epistemic sphere (e.g., taking sense-data as proposi-
tions), or treating epistemic claims independent of epistemic abilities
(e.g., taking observational reports as presupposing no other knowl-
edge, no inferring ability on the part of the reporter). The given is
thus inextricably tied to foundational accounts of knowledge, which
also turns out to be mythical.
3 The latter, in principle, can play a role in justiﬁcations when rendered in proposi-
tional form of “x looks φ,” still they could not “have the foundational status of an
epistemological Given” (Koons 2006, p. 147).
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GIVENNESS AND EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE IN LEWIS’S
CONCEPTUAL PRAGMATISM
Clarence I. Lewis is today widely known as a strenuous defender of the
given. He developed this conception in 1929 in Mind and the World-
Order and gave it further elaboration in 1946 in An Analysis of Knowledge
and Valuation,4 long before Sellars’s critique of the given. Yet I will argue
that Sellars’s critique of the given should not be applied to Lewis's con-
ceptual pragmatism. I shall also compare general characteristics of the
epistemic sphere as speciﬁed in Sellars with the theory of empirical knowl-
edge as it was formulated by Lewis.
If one were to read Lewis after having read Sellars, one immediately
notices that in Lewis the given does not play a directly justiﬁcatory role in
the acquiring of empirical knowledge, and as such it does not enter the
epistemic sphere. Instead, what plays such a justiﬁcatory role is our inter-
pretation of the given. And the given itself merely presupposes empirical
statements. Then, the given is, by deﬁnition, non-conceptual and so non-
epistemic. And if so, it is also – contra Sellars – not mythic.
Lewis’s arguments for the given, as Carl Sachs aptly noticed, allude to
Kant and are transcendental in character (Sachs 2015, p. 25). The
method of philosophy, for Lewis, consists in starting from what he calls
the “thick experience of every-day life” (Lewis 1929, p. 30) or the “thick
experience of the world of things” (Lewis 1929, p. 54), which constitu-
tes “pre-analytic data” for philosophical reﬂection (ibid.). Since this thick
experience of the world is available to us “only because the mind of man
takes attitudes and makes interpretations” (Lewis 1929, p. 30), the
world we actually experience is already interpreted and (to some extent)
structured by the active mind. Accordingly: “We do not see patches of
color, but trees and houses; we hear, not indescribable sound, but voices
and violins. What we most certainly know are objects and full-bodied
facts about them which could be stated in propositions” (Lewis 1929,
4Despite the existing controversy as to whether Lewis’s Mind and the World-
Order is consistent with his An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, and whether
Lewis essentially changed his views in the latter (see Gowans 1984, 1989), I take,
following Sandra Rosenthal (Rosenthal 2007), Eric Dayton (Dayton 1995), and
Lewis himself, that the two works are principally the expositions of the same
stance.
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p. 54). This constitutes a starting point for further reﬂections. Next, by
thinking through the world of thick experience, a philosopher examines
the necessary conditions for the existence of such a world. As a result, he
arrives at the concept of the given and settles that the given deduced in
this manner is a necessary prerequisite for a thick world of experience.
And being so, the given has to be independent of any conceptual inter-
pretation of the subject and immune to the changing attitude of an active
mind.
As Sachs remarks:
Lewis’s transcendental argument for the given is that if there were no
given, then there could not be any experience of the sort we manifestly
have; if there were no given, we would be purely discursive beings who
never apply or use concepts in perception or action. Indeed, given Lewis’s
pragmatist insistence on the tight connection between knowledge and
action, a purely discursive being – a being to whom nothing was given –
could not even be said to know anything at all. Such a being would be,
however, nothing at all like the kind of being that we manifestly are –
hence there must be something purely given which is conceptually inter-
preted to produce the world of thick experience, including our self-experi-
ence. Since the concept of the given is grounded in a transcendental
argument, Lewis has not yet provided any reasons for thinking that his
notion of the given is Mythic. (Sachs 2015, p. 25)
That is, Lewis’s given is not mythic in the Sellarsian sense.
Lewis refers to the general conception of the given as “the absolutely
given” (Lewis 1929, pp. 58, 305, 310), or “the total ﬁeld of the given”
(p. 134), and states that “there is, in all strictness, only one given, the
Bergsonian real duration” (p. 58). This pure givenness is a philosophi-
cal abstraction. So determined, the given is beyond any categorization
or classiﬁcation, belonging to neither objective nor subjective, since it
belongs neither to perceptible reality nor to the subject’s sensory con-
sciousness (Lewis 1929, p. 63). The given is invulnerable to skeptical
doubt, not “because it is an infallible object of experience”, but
“because the given is not an object of experience at all, and doubt is
only intelligible with regard to objects of experience” (Sachs 2015,
p. 25). Hence Sachs concludes that Lewis is not a foundationalist
about knowledge (ibid.).
Now, one can ask how the given conceived “in all strictness,” “the
absolutely given” or “Bergsonian real duration”, could enter the particular
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cognitive acts of individuals. In this context, Lewis speaks about “the element
of givenness in what we may, for usual and commonplace reasons, mark off
as ‘an experience’ or ‘an object’” (Lewis 1929, p. 59), or about “a presenta-
tion” (p. 60). Differing from the absolute sense of the given, Sandra
Rosenthal called it “relatively given,” “functionally given” (Rosenthal
2007, p. 72), or “given as taken” (p. 73), in the following sense:
The total or absolute ﬁeld of the given provides the bedrock ‘stuff’ for
awareness, and the interested mind ‘takes’ or abstracts from this ﬁeld
complexes that can be presentations of objects. Thus, the given, as the
‘stuff’ that enters into conscious cognitive processes, becomes, in fact, a
taken. This element of givenness is an event, and the form of this pre-
sentation as a gestalt or complex whole is partially dependent on the
interested mind and the conceptual structures that deﬁne its purposes,
but the ultimate stuff of the complex is as it is, independently of conscious
cognitive processes. (p. 72)
This construal of givenness – “the element of givenness” as abstracted
from “the absolutely given” – underlies our everyday perception of parti-
cular objects or states of affairs.
However, apart from the previous formulations, the given can also
be distinguished and employed as “the thin given of immediacy” (Lewis
1929, p. 54), or “there and given” (Rosenthal 2007, p. 73), being
analytically discriminated and extracted from the ordinary presentation
of an object as particular “given appearances” (Lewis 1929, pp. 354,
369). “It is the brute-fact element in perception, illusion and dream
(without antecedent distinction) which is intended” (Lewis 1929,
p. 57). Afterwards, for the sake of philosophical analysis, some groups
of similar, repeatable appearances can be classiﬁed under one sensory
qualia – such as “red,” “round,” etc. – which, in turn, are not concrete,
unique appearances, but rather concepts or “sort of universals” (Lewis
1929, p. 124). What is important on this construal of the given is that
we normally do not use them when stating observation reports, but
only when we doubt the existence of what is perceived and want to
verify a dubious empirical statement or improve our practical orienta-
tion toward future experience (Rosenthal 2007, p. 75).
The previous three versions of the given, though not explicitly
articulated in Lewis’s writings, constitute different levels of interpreta-
tion based on the different roles play in his theory of knowledge
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(Rosenthal 2007, p. 70). In the ﬁrst sense of “the absolutely given,” it
underlies our every perception, despite its being imperceptible as such.
In the second sense of the presentation of objects, or of “the element
of givenness,” it is what is shared by different people perceiving the
same objects, what is constant in their experiences independently of
any individual descriptions or classiﬁcations of it. This is also that
constant element in my perception that the private and unique sense-
appearances of mine (of the object) are correlated to, as well as which
the corresponding appearances of someone else are correlated to. This
is the third sense of momentary “there and given.” Thus, a “fountain
pen” in my hand can be described, categorized, or interpreted in a
different way by various people: a small child, an adult from a primitive
culture when seeing it for the ﬁrst time, and by myself. Still, something
constant and unalterable lies there beneath all actual and virtual
descriptions and interpretations. This is that which would remain
if we tried to subtract all concepts from each particular determinations
of a “fountain pen” (Lewis 1929, pp. 49–50). Only then would we
face non-conceptualized, but at the same time “ineffable” (p. 53),
given. Thanks to the given, not only is perception possible, but also
intersubjective communication is secured. It assures us that our
thoughts have objective purport.
As a result of this transcendental procedure, a philosopher is ready to
admit that in empirical knowledge two elements can be distinguished: “the
concept, which is the product of the activity of thought, and the sensuously
given, which is independent of such activity” (Lewis 1929, p. 37).
Consequently, “Empirical truth, or knowledge of the objective, arises
through conceptual interpretation of the given” (ibid.). Thus both elements
are needed if our knowledge is to be about the world, if it be at all assessable
as to its truth. If both our experience and our knowledge were to be
exclusively conceptual, then knowledge would have to be “contentless and
arbitrary, there would be nothing which it must be true to” (p. 39) and we
would end up on purely idealistic terms. In the opposite situation, “if there
be no interpretation or construction which the mind itself imposes, then
thought is rendered superﬂuous, the possibility of error becomes inexplic-
able, and the distinction of true and false is in danger of becoming mean-
ingless” (ibid.) – which would lead us toward some implausible realism.
Now, what is the role of the given in justifying empirical knowledge?
Obviously, it is this element which our empirical claims are about and that
secures their objective purport. The given – in this sense – is capable of
210 T. ZARĘBSKI
providing the bedrock evidence for our knowledge.5 In just this sense our
claims about the world are epistemologically signiﬁcant. Still, I ﬁnd it to be
a mistake – taking into account Sellars’s considerations on the myth of the
given – to count them as a strictly epistemological items, pace, for exam-
ple, Moser (Moser 1988, pp. 193–196) and Bonjour (Bonjour 2004,
pp. 196–199). For the only thing that enters the sphere of epistemic
justiﬁcation is not the given itself, but always our conceptual interpreta-
tions of it. And this is for us the only way to base our knowledge on the
given. Thus, it is only the interpretations of the given that are employed as
justiﬁcatory on an epistemic level.
Accordingly, in order to stipulate the epistemic sphere in Lewis, the
question about propositional character of our interpretations of the given
arises. And it seems that in Lewis any candidate for knowledge simply takes
in that things are thus and so, thus capturing our experience by means of a
priori – though pragmatically developed (Lewis 1929, p. 230, et passim) –
concepts and Such a posit is implicit inMind and the World-Order and An
Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.
In the latter book (Lewis 1946, chapter VIII), Lewis distinguishes
three different types of empirical statements comprising empirical
knowledge – to recall them here will be useful for discussing the norma-
tive and the learning aspects of knowledge. Lewis speciﬁes the following:
“expressive language, or expressive use of language” (Lewis 1946, p. 179),
“terminating judgments” and “non-terminating judgments” (Lewis 1946,
p. 181). The last mentioned, “non-terminating judgment,” constitutes an
“empirical belief” (Lewis 1946, p. 190). The speciﬁc function of expressive
statements is “that such language signiﬁes appearances. And in thus
referring to appearances, or afﬁrming what appears, such expressive lan-
guage neither asserts any objective reality of what appears nor denies any. It is
conﬁned to description of the content of presentation itself” (Lewis
1946, p. 179). Such statements are not judgments, since they do not
assert anything with objective purport. Their only task is to express our
apprehensions of the given. Paradigmatically, they use the language of
appearances, saying for example: “I see what looks like granite steps before
me,” not “There is a ﬂight of granite steps before me” (Lewis 1946, p. 179).
5 This, in turn, can be further interpreted, for example, in the spirit of phenom-
enalism (Bonjour 2004) or conceptual realism (Dayton 1995). However, discuss-
ing this question goes beyond the scope of my chapter.
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As such, they are beyond rational doubt and error. However, they can be
treated as true or false only in the sense that the subject making such a
statement may choose to tell truth or to lie about her own experience.
Nevertheless, as Rosenthal concludes on this issue, “the immediate content
apprehended . . . is not judged, it is ‘had’” (Rosenthal 2007, p. 81).
Characteristic of Lewis’s concept of a terminating judgment it states
a single passage of experience: basing it on an immediate appearance of
the given, it predicts that my undertaking a certain action will result in
my experiencing some different appearance. Accordingly, the formal
expression of the terminating judgment is: “S being given, if A then
E” (Lewis 1946, p. 184), where S is a sensory intake, A – proposed
action, and E – a predicted experience. Both S and E must be for-
mulated in expressive language. Thus, given “there is such and such
white shape in my visual ﬁeld,” if “I do something with it,” then
“there is such and so shape in my visual ﬁeld.” The prediction stated
in terminating judgments counts as knowledge because this prediction
can be true or false. Since, it seems, it covers a single and unique
passage of immediate experience, when it turns out to be true after
such practical veriﬁcation, it is true once and for all.
The third level of empirical statements, the non-terminating ones, are
judgments of objective fact, which express empirical beliefs concerning
these objective facts. The proper formal schema for it would be: “If this is a
physical object ‘O’, then if ‘S’ appearance and action ‘A’, then in all
probability ‘E’ appearance will occur” (after Rosenthal 2007, p. 82).
Here, these statements, though veriﬁable in many particular cases, are
not entirely veriﬁable and thus are always probable. Their veriﬁcation
would comprise virtually indeﬁnite number of practical consequences
and involve such a number of terminating judgments as its single corro-
boration. This is why it is impossible, restricting ourselves to actual termi-
nating judgments or actions being tested, to gain complete veriﬁcation
and certitude. What remains, instead, is their probability. As Lewis sees it,
claim such as “A piece of white paper is now before me” (Lewis 1946,
p. 180) can be veriﬁed through a sequence of terminating statements it
involves and practical consequences ﬂowing from my action:
This judgment will be false if the presentation is illusory; it will be false if
what I see is not really paper; false if it is not really white but only looks
white. This objective judgment also is one capable of corroboration. As in
the other example, so here too, any test of the judgment would pretty
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surely involve some way of acting – making the test, as by continuing to
look, or turning my eyes, or grasping to tear, etc. – and would be
determined by ﬁnding or failing to ﬁnd some expected result in experi-
ence. But in this example, if the result of any single test is as expected, it
constitutes a partial veriﬁcation of the judgment only; never one which is
absolutely decisive and theoretically complete . . . it has a signiﬁcance
which outruns what any single test, or any limited set of tests, could
exhaust. (Lewis 1946, p. 180)
Consequently, each and every objective empirical belief is always probable,
and as such, fallible.
Having the aforementioned distinctions in mind, we can come back
to discuss the next feature of the epistemic sphere, namely its normative
aspect – including epistemic fallibilism – and what I called the learning
aspect – including a version of inferentialism. Accordingly, empirical
knowledge stated in non-terminating judgments is implicitly normative
and explicitly fallible. Since complete veriﬁcation – as Lewis understands
it – of the non-terminating statements is beyond our reach, it is always
probable and never certain. And since the number of its practical con-
sequences, whose conﬁrmed effects are needed for its veriﬁcation, is
indeﬁnite, some future consequences may turn out not to be conﬁrmed.
Thus, in the face of some future data, possibly contradicting predicted
effects of actions that the statement in question involves, the original
non-terminating judgment would call for revision or even rejection.
That is a feature of Lewis’s “pragmatic fallibilism” (Rosenthal 2007,
p. 81, et passim). The empirical claims are also normative, because they
both require justiﬁcation and are open to new justiﬁcation in the face of
new evidence or unexpected practical upshots. The evidence and con-
sequences as captured in expressive and terminating statements is thus
analogous to what Sellars called the “logical space of reasons.”
As to the learning aspect, it is easier to start with inferentialism. First,
we should ask: what is Lewis’s counterpart to Sellars’s observation
reports? It seems that these reports, since they have objective purport,
constitute a subclass of Lewis’s non-terminating judgments. Is there an
analogy, even if a partial one, between these two? What they share is
their inferential articulation through which we make such reports. In
Sellars, for a perceiver to report some authoritative empirical content is
for her to make an inference: from the token of a report (e.g. “This is
green”) to her possibly asserting the existence of an object (the green
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one) in her visual ﬁeld under standard conditions (Sellars 1997, p. 75).
What an analogous perceiver in Lewis does is also make an inference,
where his having some sensory appearances (as rendered in expressive
statements) and a tested prediction resulting in expected passage of
experience (as stated in a terminating judgment) serve as a justiﬁcation
for asserting, albeit with an amount of probability, the existence of such
and such object. And although Sellars did not distinguish the pragmatic
aspect embedded in Lewis’s conception under the term of “terminating
judgement,” it is not incompatible with Sellars’s account.
Such inferentialism concerning the individual reporter’s observation
statements is included, in the learning aspect of the epistemic sphere,
since our ability to infer is part of the broader process of our growing up,
adopting certain patterns of common, social behavior, reacting in a
certain way to certain kinds of stimuli, and learning the standard and
unusual conditions of perception. Is there a similar situation in Lewis?
Though not explicitly stated, it is nevertheless implicit in his “pragmatic
conception of a priori” (Lewis 1923). In this context, Lewis declares that
our concepts, categories, and deﬁnitions “are peculiarly social products,
reached in the light of experiences which have much in common, and
beaten out, like other pathways, by the coincidence of human purposes
and the exigencies of human cooperation” (Lewis 1923, p. 177). He also
claims that our “categorical modes of interpretation may be subject to
gradual transition and even to fairly abrupt alteration . . . such alteration
in categorial interpretations is a fact of social history” (Lewis 1929,
p. 228). Accordingly: “‘The human mind’ is distinctly a social product,
and our categories will reﬂect that fact” (pp. 238–239), which is due to
the fact that “the needs of individual humans are mostly served by
cooperation with others” (p. 238). In view of this, our pragmatic a priori
categories, adjusted by common needs and experience, as well as the
likeness of our habits, or modes of behavior, in dealing with empirical
world, are the products of our learning. This includes also the minimal
knowledge behind our observation reports as well as the mere capacity
for inferring.
CONCLUSION
The main task I set at the beginning of this paper was to explore both
the nature of the myth of the given and, since the concept of given is
closely related to epistemology, also the general characteristics of the
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epistemic sphere. I distinguished these characteristics as three inter-
related features: propositional aspect of perception, normative aspect
of knowledge (including fallibilism) and indispensable learning aspect
in acquiring new knowledge (including inferentialism). Because
Sellars deﬁned the given strictly in epistemological terms as mythical,
for him there is no place for the given in empirical knowledge. Next,
my task was to examine Lewis’s conception of the given as it func-
tions in his pragmatic theory of knowledge, and to inspect whether
the features distinguished in Sellars can be ascribed – explicitly or
implicitly – to Lewis. I assumed that if Lewis developed a different,
not directly epistemological conception of the given, and since his
general account of empirical knowledge displays the characteristics
identiﬁed by Sellars, then his epistemology would be immune to
Sellars’s criticisms. In effect, I showed that in Lewis the given does
not play the role assigned to this concept by Sellars and, thus, is not
mythical. Despite all differences between the detailed conceptions of
Lewis and Sellars,6 the three general features of the sui generis epis-
temic sphere: its propositional, normative (with fallibilism), and
learning (with inferentialism) aspects are present in both conceptions.
Thus Lewis’s theory of knowledge and the given remains beyond the
scope of Sellars’s critique.7
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